By Abdulbasid Dantsoho
For years, drones have served commercial purposes like photography, videography, and aerial survey work for engineers and architects. But the same technology that made aerial imaging cheap and accessible has also made aerial attack inexpensive and available. The modification of commercial drones into improvised aerial weapons has already transformed the battlefields of Ukraine, Sudan, and, most recently, the war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Nigeria, already suffering from a prolonged insurgency in the northeast and northwest is now witnessing the same evolution, as terrorist organisations repurpose commercial drone technology for combat use. The shift raises urgent questions about the country’s readiness for a form of aerial warfare its counterterrorism architecture was not built to counter.
The clearest evidence of this shift came when the Nigerian military neutralised over 80 ISWAP fighters during a failed infiltration attempt on troops in Mallam Fatori, Abadam Local Government Area, Borno State. Intelligence gathered by the Nigerian Army from the incident indicated that the terrorists advanced largely on foot, using armed drones to weaken defenses and force a breach. The tactic of ground assault paired with aerial support signals a level of coordination that Nigeria’s military has not previously had to plan against.
Raining Bombs: Surgical Attacks
The drones themselves are unremarkable, the same quadcopters used for videography, agricultural mapping, and architectural survey. Many were manufactured for these purposes; jihadist groups have repurposed them for reconnaissance, propaganda footage, and, increasingly, payload delivery. This dual-use character is precisely what makes them difficult to regulate: a drone bought for crop-monitoring and one bought for reconnaissance are, at the retail shop, indistinguishable.
Islamic States West Africa Province (ISWAP), one of the deadliest jihadist groups operating in Nigeria has emerged as the most frequent and strategic user of this technology. It now deploys drones across the full spectrum of military function: surveillance and reconnaissance, kamikaze strikes, and propaganda filming. This range matters because it shows drone use is not an isolated tactical experiment but an integrated part of ISWAP’s operational doctrine. A shift that expands the group’s reach without expanding its manpower.
Two recent incidents illustrate the pattern. In January 2026, ISWAP fighters backed by armed drones attacked a Nigerian army base in Sabon Gari, Borno State, killing several soldiers and destroying multiple armored vehicles, including an excavator, through drone bombardment.
On November 4, 2025, the same group targeted the Kangar Forward Operating Base in Malam Fatori, using first-person-view (FPV) drones to strike coordinated defensive positions.
The Weaponisation Pathway
Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) pioneered the use of commercial drones years before their African affiliates followed suit. Through shared ideology, logistics, and intelligence, groups including ISWAP, Al-Shabaab, and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS/JASDJ) have since adopted the same tactics for aerial warfare in their own theatres. This transfer of tactics across jihadist networks rather than independent innovation by any single Nigerian group is itself significant, suggesting that Nigeria’s drone threat may keep pace with innovations and strategies elsewhere rather than keeping them lagged.
The most alarming dimension is the shift toward kamikaze FPV attacks and payload delivery via modified quadcopters, which can be remotely detonated or flown into a programmed target.
For the terrorists, this method compresses their distance between them and armed forces technical capability and so the ability to strike a fixed, hardened position, precisely the kind of target (forward bases, checkpoints) that has historically been a distant reach from insurgent attack.
It also gives them the ability to monitor security forces logistics routes, coordinate ambushes and redirection for possible withdrawal from the battlefield when overpowered by the security forces.
Cost is central to why this threat is spreading rather than staying contained. Commercial drones are sold on Aliexpress, renowned online market for as little as ₦158,000 (approximately $115), with individual components like batteries, GPS units, propellers, cameras, shells, and motherboards available for as little as ₦11,000 (approximately $8) each, with no government oversight or regulatory framework governing their sale.
Unlike military aircraft or militarized drones, which face strict production controls and licensing requirements, commercial drones are cheap, accessible, and simple to operate, removing the technical and financial barriers that have traditionally limited insurgent access to aerial capability.
Why Nigeria Is Exposed
Several structural conditions compound the threat. Nigeria’s porous borders, ungoverned spaces, and lenient import policy on drones and components give terrorist groups a reliable route to smuggle both into remote hideouts.
Counter-UAS technology remains expensive and largely absent from military bases across the Northeast and Northwest, reflecting broader resource constraints rather than a deliberate gap in strategy. That gap is widened by inconsistent regional cooperation: fluctuating Sahelian support for Nigeria’s counterterrorism effort through joint operations and intelligence-sharing leaves openings that a more consistent regional posture would close.
A further constraint is human resources, security forces lack adequate training in counter-drone response, and dedicated counter-drone units remain underdeveloped within Nigeria’s security architecture. This is a solvable gap, drones remain vulnerable to jamming and other electronic warfare measures that disrupt their communication or navigation signals, but only if the training and equipment to exploit that vulnerability are in place.
The appearance of drones in Nigeria’s insurgency landscape represents an evolution. An evolution from existing threats to the use of new tools. Even though, the limited adoption can alter battlefields dynamic, which is why early detection, regulatory oversight of the commercial drone market and genuine investment in counter-drone capability is seemingly a prerequisite for preventing an infant tactic in use by the terrorist before it escalates to becoming standard practice across the insurgency fronts Nigeria is facing.
Dr Kabir Adamu, Beacon Consulting Managing Director, described the use of drones as a troubling trend that could extend beyond military targets. For the Global Sentinel, Dr Kabir stated the need for a unified and coordinated policy on UAV(Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), including security measures to counter offensive use of UAVs.
