By Abubakar Muhammad Usman
Across northern Nigeria, from rural settlements in Katsina to remote communities in Kebbi, Zamfara, and Kano States, a quiet but far-reaching crisis is unfolding inside the country’s digital identity system, the National Identification Number (NIN) scheme.
What was designed to provide every Nigerian with a unique and verifiable identity is increasingly becoming a system where some individuals possess multiple identities, while others struggle to access identities already tied to their own biometric data.
The result is a growing contradiction at the centre of Nigeria’s digital public infrastructure: a system meant to guarantee identity uniqueness is, in some cases, enabling duplication, exclusion, and confusion.
When One Person Has Two Identities
For Nigerians, the NIN is now required for banking, SIM registration, school admissions, government social welfare interventions, passport processing, and even accessing some healthcare services.
Officially, the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) says every citizen should possess only one NIN linked to his or her unique biometric data. The commission also states that its enrollment system uses biometric de-duplication technology designed to prevent multiple registrations and detect existing fingerprints before another NIN is issued.
However, interviews conducted across Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, and Niger States suggest that some private enrollment centres are unofficial methods of bypassing those safeguards. To ramp-up their enrollments drive, NIMC enlists and licenses private vendors.
A resident of Zangon Dakata in Kano, who requested anonymity, said he ended up with two different NIN slips after discovering an error in his date of birth during registration.
According to him, he couldn’t afford the correction fee. When he approached a private registration centre for help, one of the operators suggested bypassing the correction process entirely.
“I noticed that my date of birth was wrongly captured, and when I asked for correction, they told me it would cost around N15,000. I could not afford it then,” he said.
“The staff at the centre suggested creating another NIN instead. My fingerprint was not even captured the second time. They told me they knew how to process it. That was how I ended up with two NIN slips.”
In another case from Sokoto State, Salisu (not real name) said he obtained a second identity while attempting to resolve an earlier registration issue linked to a banking requirement.
“I first registered for my NIN about ten years ago. Later, while trying to resolve documentation issues linked to a bank account requirement, another centre processed a second NIN using different details after I paid them N15,000.” he said.
In another case, a university graduate, named Bello Magaji in Katsina State, said he obtained a second NIN after officials allegedly suggested fresh enrollment as an easier alternative to correcting his date of birth.
According to him, the second registration was processed using different details and another person’s fingerprint to bypass the existing record already linked to his own biometrics.
“The correction process was difficult and expensive. The centre suggested another registration instead,” he said.
“They did not use my fingerprint for the second one. That was how the new NIN was created. Later, I discovered I could use both identities for different purposes, including banking and NYSC documentation.”
Another resident from Niger State who requested anonymity said repeated attempts to correct errors in his original registration failed.
According to him, his biometric data was captured during the first registration in 2012, but when another centre later processed a second NIN for him, they only collected his personal details without capturing his fingerprints again.
“There was an error in my first registration in 2012. After several failed correction attempts, another centre processed a fresh registration for me,” he said.
“They did not capture my biometric for the second one. They only collected my details and later gave me another NIN slip. I do not know how they processed it, but I still have both.”
Findings from this investigation reveals that duplicate NIN creation is not always driven by deliberate criminal intent. In several cases, individuals said they were encouraged by private enrollment operators to bypass official correction procedures through fresh registrations processed outside standard verification procedures.
Interviews with registrants and enrollment operators suggest that some private agents bypass biometric safeguards by altering demographic details, skipping complete fingerprint capture, or temporarily using another person’s fingerprint during fresh enrollment attempts. Multiple interviewees said the second registration process was completed without their own fingerprints being fully captured, allowing another NIN record to be generated despite an existing profile.
A cybersecurity specialist, Ahmed Ali, said such patterns point to systemic weaknesses in identity management and enrollment oversight.
“When correction systems become slow, expensive, or difficult to navigate, people naturally begin looking for shortcuts,” he said.
“That creates what we call shadow identities, where one person maintains multiple valid identity records because the system’s safeguards are being bypassed.”
Ahmed also questioned how some duplicate identities continue functioning across banking, telecom, and educational verification systems without immediate detection.
“If duplicate records can still operate across multiple platforms, then it raises questions about interoperability and real-time verification between identity systems,” he said. “Where mismatches are eventually detected, affected individuals may become excluded from services because their records no longer align across systems.”
The Brisk Business of Mobile Enrollment Agents Who Vanish With Residents’ NIN Slips
Beyond duplicate identities, this investigation also found widespread complaints involving rural enrollment exercises carried out by mobile enrollment agents operating across communities in northern Nigeria.
Most of the complaints documented during this investigation were linked to the aggressive nationwide enrollment drives that intensified between 2020 and 2022 following the Federal Government’s SIM-NIN linkage policy, which triggered mass registration across the country and increased reliance on private enrollment agents and mobile registration teams.
In Kano State, concerns about enrollment irregularities and missing identity records are already visible at private enrollment centres. At Gemu Communications Centre in Tashar Rijiyar Zaki, Kano, Abubakar Ibrahim, a staff member, said residents regularly visit the centre seeking help after discovering that biometric records linked to them already exist inside the NIMC database, despite never receiving their NIN slips.
“People come here every week complaining that someone registered them and disappeared,” he said. “Some agents go to villages, capture fingerprints, collect personal information, and promise to return with the NIN slips, but they never returned.”
According to him, many affected residents only discover the problem later while attempting to register again.
“They are told their NIN already exists in the system, but they do not know the number, they do not have the slip, and they do not even know where the registration was done,” he said.
An official at the Kano NIMC office in Kabuga along Gwarzo Road, who requested anonymity because he was not authorised to speak publicly, confirmed that the commission had received such complaints in rural communities. He said many of the operators involved are private agents accredited to conduct enrollments.
Under NIMC’s enrollment structure, licensed private centres and mobile enrollment agents are permitted to support registration exercises, particularly in underserved communities where official centres are limited.
He said some complaints suggest that certain agents may be more interested in completing large volumes of registrations because of commission-based incentives tied to successful enrollments.
“Some of these agents go to villages, register large numbers of people, and fail to return with the slips,” he said.
“We do not know whether it is intentional or negligence, but complaints like this reach us.”
He explained that when affected residents later attempt fresh enrollment, the system often detects that their fingerprints already exist in the database.
“At that point, we try to retrieve the original record using fingerprints or the phone number attached to the earlier registration,” he said.
“If that fails, the person may need to pay for retrieval services before the original NIN can be recovered.”
However, multiple affected residents interviewed during this investigation said they were unclear about any formal biometric conflict resolution mechanism beyond repeated visits to enrollment centres and manual retrieval attempts, raising concerns about accessibility and public awareness of the process.
NIMC officially advises Nigerians who lose their NIN slips not to re-enroll, but instead retrieve their existing records through approved channels, including enrollment centres, the NIMC mobile application, and the *346# USSD retrieval service.
The commission has also repeatedly warned Nigerians against sharing personal information with unauthoriszed enrollment operators or using unofficial modification platforms.
Registered But Excluded
Across rural communities in Kano, Katsina, Zamfara, and Kebbi States, interviews with residents revealed a recurring pattern: enrollment exercises conducted in the name of government support programmes, followed by the disappearance of agents and the loss of access to identity records.
While some affected residents suspected deliberate misuse of their biometric data, this investigation could not independently establish whether all cases involved intentional fraud, administrative negligence, abandoned enrollment exercises, or failures in record delivery.
In Sabuwar Gainawa community in Kura LGA of Kano State, a farmer, Ibrahim Danladi said mobile agents visited the village claiming they were registering residents for agricultural support programmes.
“They told us it was for fertiliser support and farming assistance,” he said.
“They asked for our fingerprints and information. Many of us agreed because we believed government support would follow.”
Months later, Ibrahim said he attempted to register for his own NIN but was informed that his biometric data already existed in the system.
“They told me my fingerprint was already there,” he said.
“I was shocked because I had never visited any NIN centre myself. Since then, I have not been able to properly register my SIM or open a bank account.”
The Cyeber security analyst, Ali said such cases reveal how weak enrollment oversight can create long-term exclusion risks.
“Where biometric records are improperly handled or inaccessible to registrants, affected individuals may face serious difficulties accessing identity-linked services,” he said.
In Unguwar Tudu community in Gwazo LGA, Musa Rabilu said local agents collected fingerprints and small registration fees while promising quick enrollment services.
“They came to the village and said they would help us register faster,” he said.
“They collected my information and promised to return with my slip. I did it through someone I knew who was working with them. I kept asking him about it, but in the end, they never came back, and he later said he had stopped working with them.”
He said he faced the challenge later when he attempted to register again.
“When I tried to register again, they said my data already existed in the system,” he said.
“I spent money travelling several times trying to solve a problem I did not create.”
In Maiyadiya community in Dandume LGA of Katsina State, Amina Yusuf said her teenage son faced a similar problem while attempting to process school admission requirements.
“When we went for registration, they said his fingerprint already existed,” she said.
“We were confused because he had never gone for NIN registration before.”
Similar complaints in Kaura Namoda in Zamfara State and fishing communities in Argungu, Kebbi State, where residents described what they called “one-time registration visits” linked to poverty alleviation or empowerment programmes.
A trader Sani Bala said officials came with forms and fingerprint devices, saying the exercise was linked to poverty alleviation support.
“They told us it was for government assistance and that we would benefit if we registered. We gave them everything they asked for, but they never returned,” he said.
Later, when he attempted fresh registration, he was told his identity already existed.
“I was told my fingerprint had already been used. I had no slip, no number, and no proof. It affected my business because I could not complete bank verification for transactions,” he said.
In Birnin Kebbi, a young man Baraya Abdulrahman said repeated attempts to re-register were rejected because the system showed an existing identity he had never seen before.
“It feels like someone owns my identity. I cannot even access simple services because of the issue.
“Even though it happened a long time ago, I am still hopeful that I will regain access to my information.”
What the Rules Say
NIMC says every Nigerian should have only one NIN linked to unique biometric data, with any modification to personal details processed through approved channels. The commission also says its biometric de-duplication system is designed to prevent multiple enrollments using the same fingerprints and has repeatedly warned Nigerians against using unauthorized agents or unofficial modification platforms.
However, this investigation found that many people still fall victim to abuse due to low awareness, weak monitoring, and limited access to reliable information channels, particularly in rural communities. The investigation also found that enforcement gaps and weak field-level monitoring continue to create opportunities for exploitation and exclusion.
While NIMC provides official procedures for correcting demographic information such as date of birth and names, several interviewees said private operators demanded between N15,000 and N20,000 either to process corrections or bypass the process entirely through fresh registration.
Publicly available NIMC guidelines show that date of birth correction officially attracts a processing fee. In 2021, the commission stated that date of birth correction cost ₦15,000, payable through the Treasury Single Account (TSA), while other modifications such as name or address changes attracted lower charges.
System Pressure and Digital Identity Risks
According to Ahmed Ali, the problem goes beyond administrative inefficiency and exposes deeper risks within Nigeria’s digital identity architecture.
“A National Identification Number system is only credible if it guarantees one person equals one identity,” he said warning that duplicate records weaken banking verification, telecom registration, financial services, and government programmes, “Once duplicates exist, the system can no longer reliably distinguish individuals.”
He warned that weak identity integrity affects banking systems, telecom verification, financial services, and government intervention programmes.
“In banking and fintech, multiple identities can enable fraud and weaken Know-Your-Customer verification,” he said.
“In telecom systems, duplicate identities can allow individuals to operate multiple SIM cards under conflicting records.”
“When records across NIN, banking, telecom, or educational systems stop matching properly, some individuals may eventually become locked out of services entirely,” he said.
Findings from interviews suggest that while some duplicate identities continue functioning temporarily across banking, SIM registration, and educational verification systems, mismatches eventually begin appearing when institutions attempt cross-verification using BVN, JAMB, or telecom databases. Expert warn that this creates another layer of exclusion, where individuals become trapped between conflicting identity records.
Ali recommends stronger oversight of enrollment agents, simpler and cheaper correction processes, better integration across identity-linked databases, and mandatory SMS or tracking-slip confirmations during mobile enrollment exercises.
No Response from NIMC
As of the time of filing this report, the NIMC spokesperson, Dr. Kayode Adegoke, had not responded to calls, text and WhatsApp messages, or an official email requesting clarification on duplicate registrations, rural enrollment complaints, biometric conflict resolution, and safeguards against unauthorized enrollment practices.
This report is produced under the DPI Africa Journalism Fellowship Programme of the Media Foundation for West Africa and Co-Develop.
